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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal following a guilty plea to second degree murder. Augmented Record, 
Amended Notice of Appeal. Appellant Jonathon Hernandez appeals his sentence and the denial 
of his Rule 35 motion. Id.; Augmented Record, Memorandum and Order Denying Motion to 
Reconsider Sentence Pursuant to ICR 35. Relief should be granted because the district court 
erred in violating Mr. Hernandez's due process rights and in abusing its discretion in imposing a 
sentence of 45 years to life. R Vol. II, Judgment and Commitment, filed March 31, 2014. 1 The 
court further erred in denying Mr. Hernandez's Rule 35 motion. Augmented Record, 
Memorandum and Order Denying Motion to Reconsider Sentence Pursuant to ICR 35. 
Mr. Hernandez's due process rights under the 5th and 14th Amendments and Art. I,§ 14 
were violated when the court imposed sentence based upon materially untrue information or 
materially false assumptions. State v. Morgan, 109 Idaho 1040, 1042-43, 712 P.2d 741, 743-44 
(Ct. App. 1985). Specifically, the court based its sentence on the false assumption that Mr. 
Hernandez had stabbed the victim and possibly inflicted the fatal wound and further on false 
assumptions about rehabilitative programs in prisons, about the teaching of work skills in 
prisons, and about the age at which males tend to become less violent. 
The sentence was also an abuse of discretion because it was not based upon sound 
reasonmg. 
1 Only some of the two volume Clerk's Record is properly paginated. Where page 
numbers are missing or illegible, reference will be made to volume number, document title, and 
date entered. Where page numbers are present and can be read, references will be to page 
numbers. 
And, lastly, the sentence was an abuse of discretion as it is excessive. The court imposed 
what is likely a fixed life sentence on Mr. Hernandez despite his role in the offense, his age (18 
years, 3 months, at the time of the offense), and the likelihood that Mr. Hernandez can be 
rehabilitated, given his youth at the time of the offense, prior to serving his 45 year fixed term. 
The sentence exceeds that necessary to protect society, serve as a deterrent, allow rehabilitation 
or retribution. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565,650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982). 
For the same reasons, the district court erred in denying the Rule 35 motion. 
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts 
On November 7, 2012, Elizabeth Baune was discovered murdered in her home. She died 
from multiple stab wounds in the head, neck, and chest. The autopsy noted 29 wounds including 
one from a knife which remained lodged through her head. PSI, p. 3,7, 1162-1181. 
On November 9, 2012, Mr. Hernandez was arrested. PSI p. 152. In an interview with the 
police, Mr. Hernandez said that Mike Culley had come to him and asked Mr. Hernandez to come 
to Mr. Culley's aunt's house to get some electronics and a camera. Mr. Hernandez said that he 
went along and waited outside the house smoking a cigarette. Mr. Culley went inside the house 
and then came out very scared. Mr. Hernandez went inside with Mr. Culley and saw what Mr. 
Culley had done to Ms. Baune. Mr. Hernandez went to Ms. Baune and shook her and she made a 
gargling sound. Mr. Hernandez said he looked for the weapon, but could not find it. He and Mr. 
Culley left in Ms. Baune's car. They used Ms. Baune's ATM card to get money. PSI p. 156-57. 
Mr. Hernandez was indicted for first degree murder, grand theft by possession of stolen 
property, and burglary. R Vol. I, p. 33-34. Prior to resolution of the case, Mr. Hernandez was 
also charged in a separate case with battery upon a law enforcement officer in connection with 
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events occurring while he was in pre-trial custody. PSI p. 2, 13. 
A plea agreement was reached whereby Mr. Hernandez pled guilty to second degree 
murder and all other charges, including the battery, were dismissed. Both the state and Mr. 
Hernandez were left free to argue for any appropriate sentence. Tr. 8/29/13, p. 2, ln. 17 - p. 3, ln. 
5. Mr. Hernandez retained his right to appeal and file a Rule 35 motion as part of the agreement. 
Tr. 8/29/13, p. 3, ln. 18 - p. 4, In. 3. 
In his statement in support of the plea, Mr. Hernandez said that Mr. Culley had asked him 
to go with him to his house and get clothes and credit cards. Mr. Hernandez agreed and they 
walked to Ms. Baune's house. Mr. Culley was inside for a bit, while Mr. Hernandez waited 
outside smoking. When Mr. Hernandez went inside later, he could see Ms. Baune and "was 
pretty sure she was dead." Mr. Hernandez took her car and used her credit card. He used money 
from her bank account to buy methamphetamine. Tr. 8/29/13, p. 11, ln. 22 - p. 12, ln. 9. Upon 
further questioning, Mr. Hernandez stated that he did not stab Ms. Baune, but did try to pick her 
up, and in doing so inflicted wounds from which she died. Tr. 8/29/13, p. 12, ln. 10-25. 
In the PSI questionnaire, Mr. Hernandez said that he was high on methamphetamine at 
the time of the events, but that he did not stab Ms. Baune. He did however take her car and used 
her credit card. He said he pled guilty because it would be stupid to take this felony murder to 
trial. PSI p. 10-11. 
Mr. Hernandez also stated that he felt stupid and felt bad for Ms. Baune's family. PSI p. 
11. 
At the sentencing hearing, the state presented a great deal of information about Ms. Baune 
and the impact of her death on her family and colleagues. Tr. 3/26/14, p. 44, In. 9 - p. 94, In. 5. 
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The prosecutor also stated that she had information from two unidentified jail informants. 
Tr. 3/26/14, p. 11, In. 15-21. The prosecutor summarized the first informant's information 
stating that the informant said that Mr. Hernandez told him that he had assisted in the murder of a 
woman. Tr. 3/26/14, p. 12, In. 1-2. That informant also reportedly stated that Mr. Hernandez 
told him that he had a knife and he laughed at the idea of stabbing someone who was overweight. 
However, the prosecutor did not report that Mr. Hernandez admitted to stabbing Ms. Braun, 
rather just that he had a knife, he and Mr. Culley were present, and that Mr. Hernandez had 
laughed later about Ms. Baune's weight. Tr. 3/26/14, p. 12, In. 22 - p. 13, In. 7. 2 
According to the prosecutor, a second informant claimed to have spoken with both Mr. 
Hernandez and Mr. Culley. That informant said that Mr. Hernandez told him that Mr. Culley 
stabbed Ms. Baune and that Mr. Hernandez hit her with a stick. That informant further said that 
Mr. Culley admitted to being the stabber. Tr. 3/26/14, p. 14, In. 1-23. 
The prosecutor also summarized the state's interrogations of Mr. Hernandez and Mr. 
Culley. The prosecutor noted that Mr. Hernandez never admitted to stabbing Ms. Braune. Tr. 
3/26/14, p. 15, In. 7-8. The prosecutor then stated that Mr. Culley reported that Mr. Hernandez 
hit Ms. Baune, and that he (Culley) stabbed her multiple times. Tr. 3/26/14, p. 16, In. 5-13. 
Further, in a letter to his grandfather, Mr. Culley wrote that he (Culley) "stabbed her in the head 
and drove the knife into her brain so she would not suffer." Tr. 3/26/14, p. 16, In. 18-22. The 
prosecutor concluded, "It's clear Mr. Culley believes she was still alive when he stabbed her the 
2 Mr. Culley's counsel objected to the prosecutor's recital of the information from the 
informants, noting that the name and motive of the unidentified informants could not be 
discovered and the information was umeliable. Tr. 3/26/14, p. 12, In. 6-15. The court responded 
that all the problems noted with the evidence were true and the court would give the evidence the 
weight that it believed it deserved recognizing all of its faults. Tr. 3/26/14. p. 12, In. 16-22. 
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final time." Tr. 3/26/14, In. 23-24. 
The state did not present any information that Mr. Hernandez stabbed Ms. Baune. Tr 
3/26/14. 
The state did present evidence regarding a plan that never materialized for Mr. Hernandez 
to escape from jail while in pre-trial detention. Tr. 3/26/14, p. 21, ln. 13 - p. 30, ln. 12. Mr. 
Hernandez objected and the court appeared to sustain the objection stating that it was concerned 
about considering conduct that had not even resulted in criminal charges and concluded that it 
did not want an appellate court finding the information had been wrongly considered. Tr. 
3/26/14, p. 23, ln. 23 - p. 24, ln. 9. However, the court did allow the state to continue its 
presentation. Tr. 3/26/14, p. 24, ln. 14 - p. 30, ln. 12. 
The state also presented testimony to the effect that Mr. Hernandez punched a deputy in 
the jail. Tr. 3/26/14, p. 32, ln. 5-p. 36, ln. 19. And, the prosecutor then summarized several 
other instances of misconduct ranging from threatening inmates and staff to refusing to wear a 
shirt while in the hole. Tr. 3/26/14, p. 38, ln. 4 - p. 40, ln. 6. 
Mr. Hernandez presented the testimony of his sister, who reported that he had never been 
violent before. Tr. 3/26/14, p. 100, In. 23-25. 
Mr. Hernandez also presented the testimony of Dr. Cervantes, a research psychologist and 
research director of Behavioral Assessment Incorporated in Los Angeles. Dr. Cervantes has 
taught at UCLA and USC and published extensively in areas of adolescent and adult mental 
health, Hispanic mental health and substance abuse prevention. He also is a principal 
investigator on a NIH study examining Hispanic populations and stress. And, he has long 
provided expert testimony in murder cases. Tr. 3/27 /14, p. 111, In. 11 - p. 113, In. 13. 
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Dr. Cervantes examined Mr. Hernandez and concluded that with rehabilitation in the 
future he could do quite well outside of prison. Tr. 3/27114, p. 130, ln. 1-11. 
Dr. Chad Sombke prepared a psychological evaluation of Mr. Hernandez. He found that 
Mr. Hernandez had a personality disorder. However, he also concluded that Mr. Hernandez was 
capable of rehabilitation. Dr. Sombke concluded that Mr. Hernandez "is young and he has time 
to learn how to manage his emotions, his violent behaviors, and his impulsivity in an adequate 
level to where he can become a more productive member of society." Sombke Evaluation, 
Exhibit on appeal, p. 8. 
The state argued for a life sentence for both Mr. Hernandez and Mr. Culley. Tr. 3/27 /14, 
p. 156, ln. 5-6. 
Mr. Hernandez argued for a sentence of 10 years fixed, followed by 20 indeterminate. Tr. 
3/27/14, p. 190, ln. 2-8. 
Mr. Hernandez stated to the court: 
Okay. Your Honor, I know what I did was wrong. But like my lawyer explained, 
I did not stab her, but I did contribute to the crime, and I did use these credit cards 
knowing she was dead. And I did drive away from the scene knowing she was 
dead. 
And I'm not the same person I was a year a go, a year-and-a half ago. And I just 
want to say sorry to the family of Elizabeth Baune. She didn't deserve that, and I 
understand that. And I didn't know this woman, but what from the prosecutor has 
said she was a great lady. She tried to help Mike [Culley] and everybody that she 
knew. She loved them. And I am sorry for this. I can't change it, and I know 
that. 
I just want to say sorry to my family for putting everybody through this. And 
that's it, Your Honor. 
Tr. 3/27/14, p. 190, In. 18 - p. 191, In. 8. 
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The court imposed a sentence of life with a minimum period of incarceration of 45 years. 
Tr. 3/27/14, p. 199, ln. 11-12. The court stated that Mr. Hernandez was a high risk to the public. 
Tr. 3/27 /14, p. 197, In. 6-7. The court then held that the sentence was warranted because: 1) it 
was highly unlikely that Mr. Hernandez will receive the intensive rehabilitative treatment needed, 
especially in prison; 2) after a lengthy incarceration, Mr. Hernandez will have no work skills so 
as to allow him to be a productive member of the community; 3) common sense indicates that an 
old man is not the same risk of violence as a young man. Based upon these considerations, the 
court determined that Mr. Hernandez should not be eligible for parole prior to reaching age 65. 
Tr. 3/27/14, p. 197, In. 24 - p. 199, In. 1. 
Mr. Hernandez filed a timely notice of appeal and also a Rule 35 motion for reduction of 
his sentence. R Vol. II, Motion Re: Idaho Criminal Rule 35, filed 4/18/14; Augmented Record, 
Notice of Appeal filed 4/18/14; Augmented Record, Amended Notice of Appeal, filed 5/8/14. 
The district court eventually denied the Rule 35 motion. In denying the motion the court 
wrote, "The defendant admitted stabbing Elizabeth Baune and that the wound he inflicted could 
have been the death blow suffered. Ms. Baune was left with the knife lodged through her skull." 
The court further summarized the number of stab wounds, noted that both defendants' conduct 
"reflected the lowest form of humanity" and stated that it was difficult to imagine worse 
circumstances. Augmented Record, Memorandum and Order Denying Motion to Reconsider 
Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35, filed 8/27/14, p. 4-5. 
The court went on to note that it did not give a fixed life sentence because fixed life 
would provide no incentive to Mr. Hernandez to behave or attempt rehabilitative treatment, given 
he would have no hope ofrelease. Id., p. 5. The court then reiterated its reasons for the 45-life 
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sentence, including that it was highly unlikely that Mr. Hernandez would receive was the 
intensive rehabilitative treatment outlined by the psychologists while in prison; that after a 
lengthy imprisonment, Mr. Hernandez would likely not have work skills so as to be able to be a 
productive member of the community; that the evidence supports the conclusion that he will 
continue to be a high risk of danger to the public; and that the risk of danger to the community 
diminishes with age such that a man of old age is not the same risk of violence as a younger man. 
Id. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did imposing sentence based upon materially false assumptions violate state and 
federal due process rights? Idaho Const. Art. I,§ 13; U.S. Const. Amends. 5 and 14. 
2. Was the sentence imposed predicated on sound reasoning and consistent with the 
Toohill standards? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Sentence Based Upon Materially False Assumptions Violated 
State and Federal Due Process Rights 
1. Standard of Review 
Unobjected to errors in sentencing which violate due process rights are subject to a 
fundamental error analysis. State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 88,253, P.3d 754, 762 (Ct. App. 2011). 
To establish fundamental error, Mr. Hernandez must demonstrate that one or more of his 
unwaived constitutional rights were violated; the error must clear or obvious, without the need of 
any additional inforn1ation not contained in the appellate record; and Mr. Hernandez must 
demonstrate that the error affected his substantial rights, meaning in the case of a trial error in 
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most instances that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209,226,245 P.3d 961,978 (2010). 
2. Argument 
The district court's sentence and the denial of the Rule 35 motion were based on multiple 
materially false assumptions. The sentence was imposed based upon the materially false 
assumption that Mr. Hernandez was the person who stabbed Ms. Baune, indeed the person who 
inflicted the final fatal stab wound; that rehabilitative services are not available in prison; that 
Mr. Hernandez would not acquire any work skills in prison; that Mr. Hernandez would continue 
to be a danger to society; and that the danger to society would lessen with age, but not 
sufficiently for purposes of public safety, until Mr. Hernandez is 65 years old. A sentence 
imposed based upon materially false assumptions violates the state and federal constitutional 
guarantees of due process. State v. Morgan, supra. 
As set out in Morgan, 109 Idaho at 1042-43, 712 P.2d at 743-44, a judge may consider a 
broad range of information when fashioning an appropriate sentence, but when the judge relies 
on information that is materially untrue or when the judge makes materially false assumptions of 
fact, the defendant's right to due process is abridged. See also, State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491, 
495,681 P.2d 1, 5 (Ct. App. 1984), stating that reliance on information that goes beyond the 
record and is materially untrue may be a denial of due process; State v. Dunn, 134 Idaho 165, 
172, 997 P.2d 626, 633 (Ct. App. 2000), stating that a defendant is denied due process when the 
sentencing judge relies upon information that is materially untrue or when judge makes 
materially false assumptions of fact; United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1993), 
noting a clear due process right not be sentenced on the basis of materially incorrect information. 
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Morgan sets out three Moore safeguards to minimize the danger of due process 
violations: 1) the defendant must be afforded a "full opportunity" to present favorable evidence; 
2) the defendant must be given a "reasonable opportunity" to examine all materials contained in 
the presentence report; and 3) the defendant must be afforded a "full opportunity" to explain and 
rebut adverse evidence. Id., citing State v. Moore, 93 Idaho 14, 17, 454 P.2d 51, 54 (1969). 
Morgan found a due process violation where the third Moore safeguard was not afforded. 
Morgan was charged with theft. At the sentencing hearing, the court noted that as a condition of 
bond, Mr. Morgan was to have no contact with his wife, but that "it's been reported to the Court 
that you immediately went out and violated that condition of your bond, that as a result of that 
your wife was hospitalized." This information was not in any report in the record and Mr. 
Morgan and his attorney were not previously aware of it. The court then stated that it could not 
see any redeeming factors and asked Mr. Morgan ifhe saw any lawful reason why judgment 
should not be imposed. Mr. Morgan replied that he did not, and the court imposed a fixed term 
of five years. 
Mr. Morgan both appealed and filed a Rule 35 motion. In support of the Rule 35 motion, 
he provided evidence that the court had been misinformed, specifically a letter from his wife 
stating that it was not Mr. Morgan, but a previous husband, who had abused her on the occasion 
in question. 109 Idaho at 1042, 712 P.2d at 743. 
The Court of Appeals held that Mr. Morgan's right to due process was violated because 
"in no sense can it be said that Morgan received a 'full opportunity' to explain and rebut this 
'evidence."' 109 Idaho at 1043, 712 P.2d at 744. 
Morgan further held that a harmless enor review was not appropriate, because sentencing 
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is a discretionary function not characterized by a single right or wrong result. A remand for 
resentencing could be avoided only if it was plain from the judge's reasoning that the result 
would not change or if it appeared that any different result would represent an abuse of 
discretion. Id 
Just as in Morgan, due process was violated in this case. As in Morgan, Mr. Hernandez 
only learned of the judge's materially false assumptions at the time sentence was imposed - only 
as the court pronounced sentence did Mr. Hernandez and his counsel learn that the judge 
believed that appropriate rehabilitative services were not available at the prison; that work skills 
training is not available at the prison; and that men do not age out of violent behavior until they 
are in their mid-sixties. And, like Mr. Morgan, Mr. Hernandez appealed and filed a Rule 35 
motion. It was only in the judgment on the Rule 35 motion that Mr. Hernandez learned that the 
court mistakenly believed that he had stabbed Ms. Baune and indeed had inflicted the final fatal 
wound. 
The court's assumption that appropriate rehabilitative programs are not available in the 
prisons was incorrect. The Idaho Department of Corrections (IDOC) does provide treatment and 
rehabilitative services. According to the Department's website, education and treatment at the 
prisons are based upon research and best practices. All offenders are assessed and the 
assessments are used to format a rehabilitation program to address each offender's identified risk 
and needs. Programs and services address the following areas: cognitive/behavioral; mental 
health; substance abuse; education and vocation education; family reunification; and aftercare. 
www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/education _ treatment accessed September 14, 2014. 
Likewise, the court's assumption that Mr. Hernandez would not gain any work skills 
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training while in prison was incorrect. According to IDOC, "our inmates do work." Inmates 
provide janitorial services and a majority of the maintenance work at the prisons; Correctional 
Industries employs more that 400 Idaho inmates in trades such as furniture-making, upholstery, 
printing, sign shop, and metal shop; inmate work crews assist ITD on road projects and the US 
Forest Service on firefighting and forest rehabilitation; and inmates are active in numerous 
community projects throughout the year. (www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/about_us/faq accessed 
September 12, 2014). The Department is currently featuring an article on its homepage about the 
success enjoyed by its horticulture program at the 2014 Idaho County Fair, noting that last year 
114 inmates completed the program which stresses "employable skills related to soil and media, 
plant structure, growth process, propagation and plant management." The program also involves 
inmates in work to help preserve Idaho's declining sage-grouse population through growing sage 
brush to restore habitat. (www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/story/nici_garlic _rope_ wins _top _prize 
accessed September 12, 2014). 
And, while the court's assumption that men tend to be less likely to engage in violence as 
they age is likely true, there is no scientific evidence that this tendency does not develop until 
men are in their mid-sixties. To the contrary, it appears this occurs in a man's mid-forties. 
See, Peter B. Hoffman, James L. Beck, "Burnout-Age at release from prison and recidivism," 
Journal of Criminal Justice, Volume 12, Issue 6, 1984, Pages 617-623. 
These were the false assumptions articulated at the sentencing hearing. Later, in the order 
on denial of the Rule 35 motion, another false assumption was disclosed by the court - the court 
stated that Mr. Hernandez stabbed Ms. Baune. The state never presented any evidence of this 
and Mr. Hernandez and Mr. Culley consistently denied this. 
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Mr. Hernandez was sentenced based upon multiple materially false assumptions. This 
was a violation of his right to due process. State v. Morgan, supra. This violation meets the first 
prong of the Perry fundamental error test. 
The due process violation was clear and obvious. The law is long established that 
sentences based upon false evidence or assumptions violate due process. Id The court's false 
assumptions are set forth in detail in its oral pronouncement of sentence and in its written order 
denying Rule 35 relief. And, there could be no conceivable strategic reason for counsel not to 
have objected to this error had the opportunity presented itself. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 
571,225 P.3d 700, 704 (2010), finding deficient performance when there could be no 
conceivable tactical justification for a failure to object. Thus, the second prong of the Perry test 
is met. See also, State v. Skunkcap, S. Ct. No. 41394, Slip Op. September 15, 2014, p. 19, 
finding that error in prosecutorial misconduct was clear even in the absence of an objection 
because "There is nothing to indicate that defense counsel's failure to object was a tactical 
decision." 
And, lastly, a resentencing is required. As held in Morgan, 109 Idaho at 1043, 712 P.2d 
at 744, the harmless error test is not generally applicable to constitutional errors occurring in 
sentencing. 
[S]entencing - unlike the adjudication of guilt or innocence - is a discretionary 
function. It is not characterized by a single 'right' or 'wrong' result. 
Consequently, it does not lend itself readily to a hannless error test. Rather, 
where a discretionary decision is tainted by legal or factual error, the proper 
appellate response is to remand for a proper exercise of discretion. A remand may 
be avoided only if it is plain from the judge's reasoning that the result would not 
charge or if it appears that any different result would represent an abuse of the 
judge's discretion. 
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Id. (citation omitted). See also, State v. Anderson, 152 Idaho 21,266 P.3d 496 (Ct. App. 2011), 
remanding for resentencing where the district court did not understand the full scope of its 
discretion in imposing sentence and it was not clear from the record that the court would have 
chosen the same sentence had it understood its discretionary authority. 
In this case, remand is required. The judge's careful explanation of the assumptions 
underlying the sentence imposed prevents the conclusion that it is plain that the same result 
would have been obtained if the sentence had not been based upon multiple false assumptions. 
Morgan, supra; Anderson, supra. Further, a lesser sentence would not represent an abuse of 
discretion. See, State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820, 824, 186 P.3d 676 (Ct. App. 2008), listing 
eight cases wherein sentences in which determinate terms of 25 years or less were imposed for 
second degree murder convictions. See also, State v. Anderson, supra, imposing a sentence of20 
years with 10 fixed for second degree murder; State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53,253 P.3d 727 
(2011), where a sentence of 25 years with 12 fixed was imposed for second degree murder (the 
conviction was vacated based upon an abuse of discretion in denying a motion for a new trial); 
Mendiola v. State, 150 Idaho 345,247 P.3d 210 (Ct. App. 2010), life with a fixed term of eight 
years imposed for second degree murder. 
Even if this Court determines that it must find that the error affected the outcome, Perry, 
supra, remand for resentencing is required. As discussed in the preceding paragraph, the 
sentence imposed in this case is much greater than sentences imposed in general in second degree 
murder cases. And, the judge's reasons for imposing such a great sentence were predicated on 
false assumptions. Without the false assumptions, a lesser sentence would be reasonable - the 
due process violation did affect the outcome of the case. 
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The sentence imposed based upon multiple false assumptions was fundamental error. 
Remand for resentencing is required. 
B. The Sentence Imposed was not Predicated on Sound Reasoning and 
Consistent With the Tooltill Standards Given it Failed to Take Into 
Account Mr. Hernandez's Role in the Offense, His Age, and the 
Likelihood of Rehabilitation 
1. Standard of Review 
A sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. The objectives against which the 
reasonableness of a sentence is to be measured are the protection of society, deterrence, 
rehabilitation, and punishment or retribution. The appellate court conducts an independent 
review of the record, focusing on the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. State 
v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho at 822, 186 P.3d at 678. 
A Rule 35 motion is also a matter of discretion. On appeal, the court determines whether 
the trial court abused its discretion, applying the same criteria that are used in reviewing the 
reasonableness of the original sentence. Id 
An abuse of discretion may be found if the trial court did not perceive the issue as one of 
discretion, or did not act within the boundaries of that discretion and consistently with any 
applicable legal standards, or did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason. If the trial court 
acted irrationally, an abuse of discretion will be found. Id 
2. Argument 
The sentence imposed in this case was an abuse of discretion because it was based on 
false assumptions - thus, it was not reached by a exercise of reason. Id. Likewise, the denial of 
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the Rule 35 motion was not based on a exercise of reason. Id. Therefore, the judgment imposing 
sentence must be reversed and the matter remanded for resentencing. 
In Izaguirre, the Court of Appeals found an abuse of discretion where the district court 
failed to consider the evidence presented about the maturation of the brain beyond the teenage 
years and well into the twenties; made a declaration that a sentence of twenty-five years could 
never be sufficient for second degree murder; apparently added 35 years to the recommended 
sentence of 25 years based upon the defendant's conduct in jail prior to sentencing; and 
concluded that there is a significant difference between a fixed life sentence and a sixty-year 
fixed term which would give a twenty-year old incentive to behave throughout his term of 
imprisonment. 
In this case, the district court's reasoning was similarly flawed. As discussed above, the 
sentence and denial of the Rule 35 motion were based upon the false assumptions that prison 
could not offer rehabilitative treatment, that no work skills could be acquired during 
imprisonment, that men do not age out of violence until they are in their sixties, and that Mr. 
Hernandez was the stabber who delivered the fatal wound. As in Izaguirre, the sentence and 
denial of the Rule 35 motion were based upon incomplete and false information and thus could 
not be a result of an exercise of reason. 
Interestingly, in the Rule 35 motion, the district court in this case adopted reasoning that 
had been specifically rejected as not based in reality. In Izaguirre, the district court stated that it 
had considered a fixed life sentence for the 20-year-old defendant, but rejected it because it 
would not provide the incentive that a 60-year fixed term would - the court believed that the 
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possibility of parole at age 80 would inspire Mr. Izaguirre to behave for the next 60 years in 
prison. The Court of Appeals rejected this stating: 
[T]he notion that there is a significant difference between a sixty-year fixed term 
and a fixed life term, or that the prospect of parole at age eighty would give a 
twenty-year-old offender more incentive to behave throughout his term of 
imprisonment than would a fixed life sentence, bears little basis in reality. 
145 Idaho at 825, 186 P.3d at 681. 
In the written denial of the Rule 35 motion in this case, the district court stated in support 
of its sentence which had a fixed term that would expire when 20-year-old Mr. Hernandez 
reached age 65: 
The Court gave consideration to the management issue for the prison system and 
concluded that a sentenced of fixed life gave no incentive to this defendant to 
behave or attempt rehabilitative treatment when there is no hope for release. 
Thus, a sentence of fixed life was rejected by the Court. 
Augmented Record, Memorandum and Order Denying Motion to Reconsider Sentence, p. 5. 
Just as there is little basis in reality to believe that a 20-year-old can be inspired to behave 
himself in prison for the next 60 years in order to have a chance of parole at age 80, there is little 
basis in reality to believe that a 20-year-old will be inspired to behave because that chance of 
parole will come at age 65. To a 20-year-old, 65 is nearly as unimaginable as 80. Moreover, 
even if a 20-year-old could visualize himself as a 65-year-old and plan to make parole at that 
time, he would likely reason that he could be fairly bad between now and his 50th birthday, then 
put in 15 excellent years and have as much chance for parole as he would have had if he behaved 
excellently for the full fixed term. 
In addition, other reasoning in this case was in some respects even more illogical than the 
reasoning in Izaguirre, because in this case, the court imposed the long fixed term both because 
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the long fixed term would inspire Mr. Hernandez to attempt rehabilitative treatment and because 
it was highly unlikely that Mr. Hernandez would receive rehabilitative treatment in prison. A 
sentence imposed as the result of an exercise of reason cannot be based on two contradictory 
reasons - both the incentive to engage in and the lack of rehabilitative treatment. 
Lastly, the sentence was an abuse of discretion because it failed to take into account Mr. 
Hernandez's role in the offense (he was not the stabber), his age (18 years, 3 months), and the 
likelihood that he can be rehabilitated. Both Dr. Cervantes and Dr. Sombke stated that Mr. 
Hernandez can be rehabilitated. As Dr. Sombke said, Mr. Hernandez "is young and he has time 
to learn how to manage his emotions, his violent behaviors, and his impulsivity in an adequate 
level to where he can become a more productive member of society." Sombke Evaluation, 
Exhibit on Appeal, p. 8. Taking the role in the offense, the youth, and the likelihood of 
rehabilitation, the sentence imposed was excessive with regard to all the legitimate goals of 
sentencing. 
The sentence in this case must be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing just 
as it was in Izaguirre, because the sentence was not based upon sound reasoning. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The sentence in this case must be vacated because of the due process violation and 
because it was not based upon sound reasoning. 
Respectfully submitted this ~ay of October, 2014. 
. 
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Deborah Whipple t), 
Attorney for Jonathon Hernandez 
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